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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to the Order of Transfer from the 
Utah Supreme Court dated June 4,2008 issued according to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See also, § 78A-4-103(2)0). Utah Code Ann. (2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. WAS THE BRIEF OF JONATHAN HALL SO DEFICIENT IN COMPLYING 
WITH THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE THAT THE APPEAL 
SHOULD BE DENIED OR DISMISSED? 
The standard of review for the sufficiency of a brief is to compare the brief w ith Rule 
24 and determine whether it complies therewith. Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
2. WAS THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WHERE JONATHAN HALL, WHO WAS INVOLVED IN A SEPARATE 
INCIDENT WHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED HIS ALLEGED INJURIES, FAILED TO 
DESIGNATE AN EXPERT ON CAUSATION? 
The Trial Court's determination that Jonathan Hall failed to establish a prima facie 
case on the element of causation is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Fox v. 
Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App 406, ^ [14, 176 P.3d 446. 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, controls the resolution of whether 
Plaintiffs brief is procedurally sufficient for appellate review. The text of the rule is in 
Addendum "A". This Court's holdings in Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App 
406, 176 P.3d 446 and Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, 12 P.3d 1015 control 
resolution of whether the Trial Court correctly dismissed Jonathan Hall's claims against 
Jason Steimle. The text of the foregoing cases is in Addendum WB". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury case wherein Jonathan Hall seeks compensation for alleged 
injuries and damages relating to a December 11, 2000 motor vehicle accident. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Complaint was filed on December 9, 2004 in the Fourth District Court. (R. at 3-
5). Defendant, Jason Steimle, answered on March 2, 2006. (R. at 30-33). 
After discovery was completed, and all deadlines for designating experts had passed, 
Jason Steimle filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment, 
with which this brief is concerned, was filed on December 7, 2007. (R. at 121-130). The 
Trial Court granted that motion at oral argument on March 25, 2008 with the formal Order 
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entered on April 23, 2008. (R. at 171, 176-78). This appeal was taken on May 27, 2008. (R. 
at 180). 
C DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The Trial Court granted Jason Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment upon finding 
that Jonathan Hall was required to designate a causation expert regarding whether the motor 
vehicle accident at issue caused the injuries for which he seeks compensation. The Trial 
Court held that because Jonathan Hall failed to designate a causation expert, he could not 
establish that the December 2000 motor vehicle accident caused the injuries at issue in his 
complaint. (R. at 176-78). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of December 11, 2000, Jonathan Hall was riding as a 
passenger in Jason Steimle's vehicle as they traveled from Rexburg, Idaho to Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Prior to reaching Salt Lake City, the weather had been clear. (R. at 4-5, 116, 135). 
As the vehicle approached the 33rd South off-ramp on I-15, Mr. Steimle saw that a car 
was off the road. In response, Mr. Steimle slowed his vehicle from freeway speeds to about 
40 to 45 miles per hour. (R. at 4-5, 118). 
Mr. Steimle's vehicle then began to slide on black ice. After sliding 20 to 30 yards, 
the vehicle collided with the retaining wall of the off-ramp. (R. at 117-18). Due to the 
weather conditions, Jonathan Hall was surprised there was black ice on the road. (R. at 115). 
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At the point of impact, Mr. Hall's head moved to the side. His head did not hit a 
window or any other objects inside the vehicle. (R. at 113-14). Mr. Hall did not go to the 
hospital after the accident. (R. at 134). 
Although there is some confusion in the record, it appears Mr. Hall presented to the 
Anderson Chiropractic Center with complaints of neck pain on December 11, 2000. (R. at 
132).1 
Mr. Hall had already consulted with Dr. Anderson regarding his neck pain prior to the 
motor vehicle accident at issue (the "MVA"). On October 4, 2000, just two months prior to 
the MVA, Mr. Hall received a chiropractic assessment from Anderson Chiropractic Center, 
at which time he complained of neck and back pain, rating his neck pain at a 4 on a scale 
from 1 to 10. At that time, Mr. Hall was assessed as having chronic cervical dorsal 
myofascial pain syndrome with C7/T1 subluxation, as well as thoracic and ankle dysfunction. 
(R. at 107). 
Regarding pre-existing neck and back injuries, Mr. Hall stated the following in 
response to discovery requests: "Plaintiff had a whiplash injury in the summer of 1998/1999 
when he dove into a shallow lake. He was treated by Dr. Frank Smith [in Wichita, Kansas]. 
1
 During his deposition, Mr. Hall could not recall whether he experienced neck pain 
the morning after the incident or a couple of days later. (R. at 132-33). Nevertheless, the 
precise timing of Mr. HalPs alleged neck pain is not material to this appeal. 
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He sustained a back injury and whiplash injury from hitting his chin on the lake bed." (R. 
at 104-05). 
On December 9, 2004, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, asserting negligence claims 
against Mr. Steimle in connection with the December 2000 MVA. (R. at 4-5). 
In his Complaint, Mr. Hall alleges he "suffered permanent injuries to his neck and 
back," caused by Mr. Steimle's alleged negligence. (R. at 4). 
Under the Trial Court's Amended Stipulated Scheduling Order, Plaintiffs expert 
reports were due on June 1, 2007. Plaintiff neither designated nor otherwise provided an 
expert report to the Trial Court or Mr. Hall's counsel. (R. at 99-100, 177). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court's ruling on Mr. Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
upheld based on the following: 
First, Mr. Hall's brief fails to provide any citation to the Record and therefore fails to 
comply with Rules 24(a)(7) and 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Accordingly, Mr. Hall's appeal should be dismissed. 
Second, the Trial Court correctly held that Mr. Hall was required to designate an 
expert in order to meet his prima facie burden on the element of causation. Prior to the 
December 2000 MVA, Mr. Hall suffered a whiplash injury when he dove into a shallow lake. 
Because Mr. Hall was still treating for neck pain just prior to the MVA, he cannot establish 
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his neck problems were caused by the MVA absent expert testimony. Because Mr. Hall 
never retained an expert to render an opinion on causation, the Trial Court correctly 
dismissed his claims. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE FORM OF THE JONATHAN HALL BRIEF REQUIRES DISMISSAL 
A. LEGAL STANDARD 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure makes clear that an appellant's brief 
"shall be supported by citations to the record...." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). 
The mandatory language of Rule 24 has long been enforced by this Court. For 
example, in State v. Reiner s, 803 P.2d 1300 (Utah App. 1990), this Court stated that a brief 
must have some support for every contention made in the brief. A brief must also develop 
appellate arguments and explicitly tie those arguments to the Record. West Valley City v. 
Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991). Furthermore, the failure to make 
a concise statement of facts and citation to the pages in the Record where those facts are 
supported will result in this Court assuming the correctness of the judgment below. Steele 
v Board of Review of Industrial Comm }n, 845 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1993). 
6 
B. THE JONATHAN HALL BRIEF FAILS TO PROPERLY CITE TO 
THE RECORD 
Mr. Hall's brief fails to follow the requirements of Rule 24(a)(7) and 24(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mr. Hall does not provide this Court with a single citation to 
the official Record. Instead, Mr. Hall adopts his own procedure of placing documents he 
believes to be relevant in the addendum to the brief and then simply citing to that addendum. 
A reading of Rule 24 and the case law cited above shows that this Court has a reasonable 
standard of anticipating briefing will be completed in compliance with Rule 24. Rule 24 is 
structured to allow this Court to review the case without shifting the work to the Court of 
Appeals to compensate for deficiencies in the legal advocacy of the brief. Mr. Halfs brief 
fails to meet that standard. As explained above, failure to cite to the official record has been 
found sufficient alone to dismiss or affirm an appeal. 
Rather than providing this Court with Record evidence in order to support his 
arguments, Mr. Hall improperly expects this Court to verify his arguments by searching the 
Record on its own. Accordingly, Mr. Halfs appeal should be dismissed for failure to follow 
the fundamental rules of presenting an argument to this Court. 
II. BECAUSE MR. HALL FAILED TO DESIGNATE A CAUSATION EXPERT, 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED HIS CLAIMS 
Because Mr. Hall failed to present expert testimony to establish prima facie evidence 
of causation, the Trial Court correctly granted Mr. Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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According to the Utah Supreme Court, u[c]ausation is one of the critical elements of any 
negligence action." Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah 1999). In the present 
action, Mr. Hall is unable to prove that the December 2000 MVA caused injuries to his neck 
and back. Accordingly, the Trial Court properly dismissed his claims. 
A. Expert Testimony Is Necessary to Establish a Causal LinkBetween the Motor 
Vehicle Accident and Plaintiffs Alleged Injuries 
Mr. Hall seeks damages for "'permanent injuries to his neck and back," as well as 
medical expenses allegedly related to the MVA. However, any causal link between the 
December 2000 accident and Mr. Hall's alleged injuries is beyond an ordinary lay person's 
knowledge, which required Mr. Hall to present expert causation testimony. The Utah Court 
of Appeals addressed this precise issue in Beard v. K-Mart Corporation, 2000 UT App 285, 
12P.3d 1015. 
In Beard, the plaintiff was injured in a K-Mart store when an employee struck her in 
the head with his elbow as he attempted to start a lawnmower. Id. at <p. Thereafter, the 
plaintiff sought damages relating to surgeries, which she alleged were necessitated by the 
accident. Id. Although the plaintiff retained an expert, he was unable to testify to a degree 
of medical probability that the accident at K-Mart caused the need for the surgeries. Id. at 
1^3. The Utah Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was therefore unable to prove the 
accident caused the need for surgery: 
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In Utah, in all but the most obvious cases, testimony of lay 
witnesses regarding the need for specific medical treatment is 
inadequate to submit the issue to the jury. Where the injury 
involves obscure medical factors which are beyond an ordinary 
lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a 
finding, there must be expert testimony that the negligent act 
probably caused the injury. 
The diagnosis and potential continuance of a disease are medical 
questions to be established by physicians as expert witnesses and 
not by lay persons. Thus, we conclude expert testimony on this 
medical causation issue was required before the issue of 
damages arising from these surgeries was submitted to the jury. 
Id. at 1} 16. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The Court of Appeals recently revisited this issue in the case of Fox v. Brigham Young 
University, 2007 UT App 406, 176 P.3d 446. In Fox, the plaintiffs brought suit against BYU 
for negligence and loss of consortium, alleging BYU had negligently maintained stairs on 
its property, which caused the plaintiff to slip, fall, and break her leg. Id. at ^|8. Prior to the 
accident, the plaintiff had been diagnosed with osteoarthritis in her right knee. Id. Before 
trial, the plaintiffs conceded they would not be presenting expert testimony, asserting that lay 
testimony was sufficient because the injury and damages experienced were within the realm 
of common experience. Id. at 1|9. Based on the plaintiffs' pre-existing condition, BYU 
brought a motion in limine, arguing expert testimony was required to establish a causal link 
between the incident at BYU and the plaintiffs injuries. Id. at ^[8. The trial court, 
recognizing the dispositive nature of BYU's motion in limine, converted the motion to one 
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for dismissal. Id. at ^jlO. The trial court held that the plaintiffs '"could not sustain their 
burden of proof as to causation and damages because [plaintiffs'] lay witness testimony was 
insufficient to establish their prima facie case." Id at 1J11. The trial court noted that "it had 
been presented with two plausible theories of causation - failure of an osteoarthritic knee or 
defective stairs - and, absent expert testimony, the court would have to use speculation to 
choose between the two theories." Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that the "causal connection 
between the alleged negligent act and the injury is never presumed and ... this is a matter the 
plaintiff is always required to prove affirmatively." Id. at |^21 (quoting Jackson v. Colston, 
209 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1949)). 
Based on the foregoing law in Utah, the Fox court held: "[the plaintiff s] lay testimony 
would not have been sufficient to determine whether the need for her medical treatment, the 
surgery and attachment of the fixator, was caused by B YU's allegedly defective stairs or the 
failure of her own arthritic knee." Id. at ^|23. Because the plaintiffs lay testimony was 
insufficient, ''the trial court correctly ruled that [the plaintiff] had failed to prove the element 
of causation." Id. 
Like the plaintiffs in Beard and Fox, Mr. Hall was required to retain an expert to 
testify that the December 2000 MVA caused permanent injuries to his neck and back. 
Furthermore, expert testimony was required to establish a causal link between the MVA and 
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Mr. Hall's medical expenses. It is undisputed that prior to the accident at issue, Mr. Hall 
suffered a whiplash injury when he dove into a shallow lake. After that incident, Mr. Hall 
sought medical treatment from Dr. Smith in Wichita, Kansas for neck and back pain. As of 
October 2000, just two months prior to the MVA, Mr. Hall presented to Dr. Anderson with 
continued complaints of neck and back pain, rating his neck pain at a 4 on a scale from 1 to 
10. At that time, Mr. Hall was assessed as having chronic cervical dorsal myofascial pain 
syndrome with C7/T1 subluxation, as well as thoracic dysfunction. 
Based on the complexity of Mr. Hall's alleged neck and back injuries, an ordinary lay 
person would be forced to speculate as to whether the December 2000 MVA caused any 
injuries. Moreover, any such lay person would have to speculate as to the necessity of 
Plaintiffs medical expenses. Under Mr. Hall's theory of the case, the finder of fact would 
have to simply guess what caused Mr. Hall's injuries: (1) Mr. Hall's lake-diving accident; 
or, (2) the December 2000 accident. Accordingly, Mr. Hall is unable to prove the element 
of causation. As was the case in Beard and Fox, Mr. Hall was required to provide expert 
testimony on the issue of causation. Because Mr. Hall failed to designate an expert on 
causation, the Trial Court correctly dismissed his claims. 
B. Mr. Hall Misconstrues Utah Case Law Regarding the Need for Expert 
Testimony on Causation 
Mr. Hall argues that, under Utah law, "cases involving injuries to the neck, back and 
shoulder resulting from car accidents involve medical damages within the common 
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experience of a layperson." (Hall Brief, p. 11). In order to support this assertion, Mr. Hall 
cites two cases from other jurisdictions, Jordan v. Srnoot, 380 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. App. 1989) 
and Waltonv. Gallbraith, 166 N.W.2d 605,606 (Mich. App. 1969).2 Both cases are factually 
distinguishable from the present case. 
In Jordan, the undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff had never been under 
medical care for similar injuries prior to the auto accident in question. 380 S.E.2d at 714. 
Similarly, in Walton, the Michigan Court of Appeals emphasized that the plaintiff had 
experienced "no previous neck or back pains" and that the pain began wCon the day after the 
accident." 166 N.W.2d at 606. Because neither of the plaintiffs sought medical treatment 
for similar injuries prior to the motor vehicle accidents in question, the Walton and Jordan 
courts correctly found that no expert testimony was required on causation. 
To the contrary, in this case Mr. Hall suffered neck and back injury prior to the 
December 2000 accident. Indeed, Plaintiff was still actively treating for neck pain in October 
2000, just two months prior to the accident. Accordingly, the Walton and Jordan cases are 
distinguishable from, and therefore inapplicable to, the present action. 
2These same cases were addressed in Beard v. K-Mart Corporation, 2000 UT App 
285, 12 P.3d 1015. The Beard court ultimately dismissed their applicability, since "they 
involve[d] medical damages within the common experience of a layperson." Id. at ^]13. 
12 
C. Mr. Hall Cannot Rely on Treating Physicians to Provide Causation 
Testimony 
In his opening brief, Mr. Hall argues he has designated Dr. Anderson, one of his 
treating physicians, as a fact witness. (Hall Brief, p. 12). Mr. Hall argues that *wDr. 
Anderson's testimony concerning observable changes to Mr. Hall's condition versus his 
condition prior to the accident on December 11, 2000 is sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case of negligence." (Id.) Contrary to Mr. Hall's argument, treating physicians offering 
expert opinions must be designated in accordance with Ut. R. Civ. P. 26 under Utah law. 
In Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UTApp. 303,141 P.3d 629, the plaintiff brought medical 
malpractice claims against her plastic surgeon based on his alleged failure to remove gauze 
packing from a wound site. Id. at Tflf3-4. During the discovery phase, the plaintiff designated 
several treating physicians as individuals likely to have discoverable information. Id. at ^5. 
However, the plaintiff did not designate any expert witnesses by the deadline imposed under 
the applicable scheduling order. Id. at [^6. The defendant thereafter filed a Motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had not designated any expert to opine as to the 
appropriate standard of care and breach. Id. In response, the plaintiff offered the affidavit 
of one of her treating physicians, opining as to the standard of care. Id. The trial court 
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff 
offered no expert testimony. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that "treating physicians are 
always exempt from the [expert disclosure] requirements of rule 26(a)(3)." Id. at Ijl 1. 
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This Court rejected that argument, holding: 
To the extent a treating physician simply provides a factual 
description of his or her personal observations during treatment, 
the testimony is not opinion evidence and no identification of 
the treating physician as an expert is required. If, however, the 
treating physician also offers an opinion as to the standard of 
care or whether that standard has been breached, the testimony 
is no longer simply factual. 
Id. at [^13 (case citations omitted). In reaching its holding, the Court of Appeals also found 
support from other jurisdictions: 
If [treating physicians] only testify as to what they observed and 
did within the physician-patient relationship, then they would be 
fact witnesses; if, in addition to testifying about the facts, the 
treating physicians offered an opinion, then they would be 
expert witnesses. 
Id. at H14 (quoting Smith v. Paiz, 84 P.3d 1272, 1275-76 (Wyo. 2004)). See also Thomas v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 169 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. Mass. 1996) (case cited by Utah Court of Appeals, 
requiring disclosure and an expert report where treating physician offered opinion on 
causation: "a treating physician who has formulated opinions going beyond what was 
necessary to provide appropriate care for the injured party steps into the shoes of a retained 
expert for purposes of rule 26(a)(2)"). 
In the present action, it is undisputed Mr. Hall neither designated an expert nor 
submitted any expert reports. Therefore, under the plain language of Youngblood, Mr. Hall's 
treating physicians may not offer any opinions as to the cause of his injuries. Because Mr. 
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Hall is unable to provide any evidence on causation, the Trial Court properly granted Mr. 
Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
III. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Mr. Hall argues two disputed facts should have precluded the Trial Court from 
granting Mr. Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment: (1) when Mr. Hall began 
experiencing pain after the December 2000 accident; and (2) the location, type, and severity 
ofthe pain experienced by Mr. Hall following the accident. (Hall Brief, p. 12). Both issues 
are immaterial to Mr. Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Mr. Hall argues that Mr. Steimle's causation arguments are "based upon the fact that 
there was a gap of a couple days between the accident and when Mr. Hall began seeking 
treatment." (Hall Brief, p. 13). As set forth above, Mr. Steimle's causation argument has 
nothing to do with Mr. Hall's date of treatment. Indeed, fact seven of Mr. Steimle's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment stated that Mr. Hall obtained 
treatment on December 11, 2000, the same day as the accident. The confusion regarding Mr. 
Hall's treatment comes from his own deposition testimony, wherein he stated he may not 
have begun experiencing pain for a couple of days after the accident. Either way, Mr. HalPs 
first date of treatment is irrelevant to Mr. Steimle's arguments on appeal, as well as his 
Motion for Summary Judgment before the Trial Court. Rather than basing his causation 
arguments on Mr. Hall's first date of treatment, Mr. Steimle bases his argument on Mr. HalFs 
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pre-existing injuries and treatment, coupled with his failure to obtain an expert on causation. 
Thus, the date Mr. Hall first began treatment after the December 2000 accident is irrelevant 
to his inability to establish causation. 
As to the second "disputed" fact, Mr. Hall's testimony regarding the pain he 
experienced after the December 2000 accident is also immaterial. Mr. Hall is not a medical 
expert. He is unable to offer testimony regarding whether the December 2000 accident, or 
his early lake-diving incident, caused his alleged injuries. Only a medical expert is able to 
offer such testimony. Even with Mr. Hall's self-serving testimony, a fact finder would still 
be forced to speculate as to whether the December 2000 accident or Mr. Hall's lake-diving 
incident caused his injuries. Because Mr. Hall failed to designate an expert to provide 
opinions regarding causation, he is unable to establish a causal link between the December 
2000 MVA and his alleged injuries. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's ruling on Mr. Steimle's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this <A day of February, 2009. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P C . 
NAN T. BASSETT 
GARY T. WIGHT 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Rule 42(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
B. Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App 406, 176 P.3d 446 and Beard v. K-
Man Corp., 2000 UT App 285, 12 P.3d 1015. 
C. Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j) 2008 
D. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
A 
46 A W Addendum "A 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 42(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Westlaw* 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 24 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
* ! Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
^li Title V. General Provisions 
-• RULE 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order 
indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought 
to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list 
should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and oth-
er authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review 
with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative 
of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an 
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of pro-
ceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for re-
view shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations 
to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
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(a)(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensa-
tion of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading un-
der which the argument is arranged 
(a)(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal 
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph The ad-
dendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick If the addendum 
is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table ot contents The addendum shall contain a copy of 
(a)(l l)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim in the brief, 
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion, in all cases any court 
opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service, and 
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts ot the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, 
such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the tran-
script of the court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this 
rule, except that the appellee need not include 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appel-
lant, or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant The appellee may 
refer to the addendum of the appellant 
(c) Repl> brief. The appellant may file a brief in leply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-
appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the 
cross-appeal Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing bnet The con-
tent of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No 
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further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a 
minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee " It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive 
terms such as "the employee,1' "the injured person,' "the taxpayer,11 etc 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as pagin-
ated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement pre-
pared pursuant to Rule 11(0 oi 1 !(g) References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify 
the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and 
each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber 
References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of 
which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, 
offered, and received or rejected 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply 
bnets shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any 
addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this 
rule In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice ot appeal 
shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the couit otherwise orders Each party shall 
be entitled to file two briefs No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's bnets shall in combination exceed 
75 pages 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Briet of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond 
to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-A.ppellee, 
which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall repl> to the Brief of Cross-
Appellee 
(h) Permission for over length brief. W/hile such motions are disfavored, the court tor good cause shown mav 
upon motion permit a party to file a briet that exceeds the limitations ot this rule The motion shall state with 
specificity the issues to be bneted, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause tor granting the 
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motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional 
pages need not be accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the 
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in 
camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional 
pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be des-
troyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or 
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single 
brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may simil-
arly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a 
party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly ad-
vise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall 
be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There 
shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but 
the letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 
words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically 
arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court 
may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; November 1, 1999; April 1, 
2003; November 1, 2004; April I, 2006; November I, 2006; April 1, 2008.] 
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2008 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currcntness 
State Court Rules 
*g| Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rcfs & Annos) 
*j§l Part V. Depositions and Discovery 
-• RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)( I) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as otherwise stipulated or 
directed by order, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discover-
able information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the 
information; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable documents, data compilations, 
electronically stored information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party support-
ing its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment; 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making available for in-
spection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such 
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any person carrying 
on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the case or to 
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) 
shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated 
by the parties or ordered by the court, a party joined after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures 
within 30 days after being served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reason-
ably available and is not excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the invest-
igation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because an-
other party has not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an administrative 
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agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and 
(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not represented by counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are subject to discovery un-
der subpart (b). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present 
evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Lvidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall, with respect to 
a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared 
and signed by the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to 
testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the 
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the 
witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of 
any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four 
years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by subdivi-
sion (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, 
if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another 
party under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following information regarding the evid-
ence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment: 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each witness, separ-
ately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the party may call if the need arises; 
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of a deposition 
and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of other evid-
ence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and those which the party may offer if the 
need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) 
shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified by the 
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court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (1) any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition 
designated by another party under subparagraph (B) and (n) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, 
that may be made to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C) Objections not so dis-
closed, other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the \ h&h Rules or Fvidence, shall be deemed waived 
unless excused by the court for good cause shown 
(a)(5) Form oj disclosures Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, all disclosures un-
der paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and served 
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following 
methods depositions upon oral examination or written questions, written interrogatories, production of docu-
ments or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes, physical 
and mental examinations, and requests for admission 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, 
the scope of discovery is as follows 
(b)(1) In general Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking dis-
covery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condi-
tion, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons hav-
ing knowledge of any discoverable matter It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be in-
admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admiss-
ible evidence 
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identi-
fies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost The party shall expressly make any claim that 
the source is not reasonably accessible, describing the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of 
the information not provided, and any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim On 
motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that 
the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost If that showing is made, the court 
may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of 
subsection (b)(3) The court may specify conditions for the discovery 
(b)(3) Limitations The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall 
be limited by the court if it determines that 
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other 
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive, 
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the lnrorm-
ation sought, or 
(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance ot the issues at stake in the litig-
ation The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivi-
sion (c) 
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(b)(4) Trial preparation Materials Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, a party may ob-
tain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representat-
ive (including the party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the 
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the party is 
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means In ordering 
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure 
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a 
party concerning the litigation 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previ-
ously made by that party Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a state-
ment concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person If the request is refused, the 
person may move for a court order The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in 
relation to the motion For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement 
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, 
or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the 
person making it and contemporaneously recorded 
(b)(5) Trial preparation Experts 
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented 
at trial If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after 
the report is provided 
(b)(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially 
employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be 
called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under 
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other 
means 
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time 
spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, and 
(b)(5)(C)(n) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(A) ot this rule the court may require, 
and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party 
seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter 
party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert 
(b)(6) Claims oj Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials 
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules 
by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the 
claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or dis-
closed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to 
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assess the applicability of the privilege or protection 
(b)(6)(B) Information produced If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or 
of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the in-
formation of the claim and the basis tor it After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or des-
troy the specified information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim 
is resolved A receiving party may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination 
of the claim If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps 
to retrieve it The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, accompanied 
by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in 
an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is 
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be 
taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following 
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had, 
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time 
or place, 
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking 
discovery, 
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters, 
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court, 
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court, 
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed 
or be disclosed only in a designated way, 
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be 
opened as directed by the court 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as 
are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery The pro\isions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the 
award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except tor cases exempt under bubdiv tsion (a)(2), except as authorized 
under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court a party may not seek dis-
covery from any source before the parties have met and conferred as required b\ subdivision (f) Unless other-
wise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, fact discoverv shall be completed within 240 days atter the 
first answer is filed Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and vutnesses and in the in-
terests of justice, orders otherwise methods of discovery may be used in anv sequence and the tact that a party 
is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise shall not operate to delay any other party's discov-
Q 2009 Thomson Reuters West No Claim to Ong LS Gov Works 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 Page 6 
ery 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision (a) or responded to a 
request for discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include inform-
ation thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances 
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party 
learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or 
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or 
in writing With respect to testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) 
the duty extends both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a deposition of 
the expert 
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, request for production, 
or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect 
and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the 
discovery process or in writing 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise stipulated or directed 
by order 
(0(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in person or by telephone 
to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for settlement ot the ac-
tion, to make or arrange for the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1), to discuss any issues relating to pre-
serving discoverable information and to develop a stipulated discovery plan Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule 
the meeting The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good faith to agree upon 
the discovery plan 
(0(2) The plan shall include 
(0(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under subdivision (a), 
including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made or will be made, 
(0(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be completed, whether discov-
ery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should be limited to particular issues, 
(0(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, includ-
ing the form or forms in which it should be produced, 
(0(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, including—it the 
parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after production—whether to ask the court to include their 
agreement in an order, 
(0(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these mles and what other 
limitations should be imposed, 
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(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for allocating fault to a non-party 
and the identity of the non-party, and 
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court 
(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any event no more than 
60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity with the parties' stipulated discov-
ery plan The proposed form of order shall also include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(l)-(8), except 
that the date or dates for pretrial conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court 
or may be deferred until the close of discovery If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a discovery plan 
or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry of a discovery order on any 
topic on which the parties are unable to agree Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the presumptions estab-
lished by these rules shall govern any subject not included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan 
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under Rule 16(b) 
(f)(5) A party joined atter the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery plan and discovery or-
der, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the discovery plan and order The stipula-
tion or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after joinder 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request for discovery or response or ob-
jection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of record or by the party if the party is 
not represented, whose address shall be stated The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification 
that the person has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, in-
formation, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by exist-
ing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, (2) not interposed 
tor any improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of lit-
igation, and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery 
already had in the case the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation If a 
request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall not be obligated 
to take any action with respect to it until it is signed 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose 
upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is 
made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable ex-
penses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding in another state 
may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions 
and limitations as it such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided that in order to obtain a sub-
poena the notice of the taking of such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which 
the person whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising 
during the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submit-
ted to the court m the count) where the deposition is being taken 
(i) Filing. 
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(i)(l) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for discovery with the 
court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the disclosures or requests for discovery 
have been served on the other parties and the date of service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall 
not file a response to a request for discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service 
stating that the response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in Rule 
30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed with the court. 
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach to the motion a 
copy of the request for discovery or the response which is at issue. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
*ii Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Rcfs & Annos) 
*\g Title VI. Certification and Transfer Between Courts 
- • RULE 42. TRANSFER OF CASE FROM SUPREME COURT TO COURT OF APPEALS 
(a) Discretion of Supreme Court to Transfer. At any time before a case is set for oral argument before the 
Supreme Court, the Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any case except those cases within the Supreme 
Court's exclusive jurisdiction. The order of transfer shall be issued without opinion, written or oral, as to the 
merits of the appeal or the reasons for the transfer. 
(b) Notice of Order of Transfer. Upon entry of the order of transfer the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall give 
notice of entry of the order of transfer by mail to each party to the proceeding and to the clerk of the trial court. 
Upon entry of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall transfer the original of the order and 
the case, including the record and file of the case from the trial court, all papers filed in the Supreme Court, and 
a written statement of all docket entries in the case up to and including the order of transfer, to the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals. 
(c) Receipt of Order of Transfer by Court of Appeals. Upon receipt of the original order of transfer from the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall enter the appeal upon the Court of Appeals 
docket. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall immediately give notice to each party to the proceeding and to 
the clerk of the trial court that the appeal has been docketed and that all further filings will be made with the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals. The notice shall state the docket number assigned to the case in the Court of Ap-
peals. 
(d) Filing or Transfer of Appeal Record. If the record on appeal has not been filed with the Clerk of the Su-
preme Court as of the date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall notify the clerk of the 
trial court that upon completion of the conditions for filing the record by that court, the clerk shall transmit the 
record on appeal to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. If, however, the record on appeal has already been trans-
mitted to and filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court as of the date of the entry of the order of transfer, the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within five 
days of the date of the entry of the order of transfer. 
(e) Subsequent Proceedings Before Court of Appeals. Upon receipt by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of 
the order of transfer and the entry thereof upon the docket of the Court of Appeals, the case shall proceed before 
the Court of Appeals to final decision and disposition as in other appellate cases pursuant to these rules. 
(f) Finality of Order of Transfer. An order of transfer, when entered by the Clerk of the Supreme Court, is fi-
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nal and shall be subject to reconsideration only in the Supreme Court and only on jurisdictional grounds. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Former Rules 4A and 4B have been renumbered as Rules 42 and 43 respectively and included in a new title gov-
erning the certification and transfer of cases between courts. The amendments make uniform the practices fol-
lowed by the two appellate courts in transferring cases. 
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Exhaustion of state remedies 2 
Law of case I 
1. Law of case 
State Supreme Court's prior denial of motion to supplement record to include depositions which had not been 
published in trial court record constituted the law of the case and would not be reconsidered by Court of Appeals 
after case was transferred to it by Supreme Court. Conder \ . A.L. Williams & Associate*, Inc.. 1987, "39 P.2d 
634. Courts € ^ > 99(6) 
2. Exhaustion of state remedies 
Petitioner's original appeal to Utah Supreme Court, which was transferred to Utah Court of Appeals, did not 
constitute exhaustion of state remedies, for purposes of federal habeas corpus; transfer process was an overflow 
mechanism and not a review on the merits. Utah Rules App.Proc, Rule 42. Duhn \ Cook. 1992, 95" F.2d 758. 
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H 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Joseph R. FOX and Linda A. Fox, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah non-
profit corporation, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 20061132-CA. 
Dec. 28, 2007. 
Background: Slip and fall victim sued university 
alleging negligence that caused her to fall down 
steps on campus. University moved to dismiss on 
grounds that expert testimony was required by 
plaintiff to prove causation and plaintiff was rely-
ing solely on her own testimony. Plaintiff moved to 
limit admissibility of university emergency medical 
technician's report. The Fourth District Court, 
Provo Department, Fred D. Howard, J., granted the 
motion to dismiss and denied motion in limine. 
Plaintiff appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held 
that: 
(1) statements made to university emergency med-
ical technicians regarding plaintiffs fall were ad-
missible, and 
(2) plaintiff was required to submit expert medical 
testimony to made prima facie case for causation. 
Affirmed.' 
West Headnotes 
\\\ Evidence \51 € ^ > m 
I 57 Evidence 
I 5~T\ Admissibility in General 
!5~TV(B) Res Gestae; Excited Utterances 
I5"k I24 Acts and Statements of Person 
Sick or Injured 
15 "7k 1 2N k. Statements to Physicians. 
Yfo-it Cited l ascs 
Statements made by plaintiff regarding her medical 
condition and the nature of her fall down some 
steps on campus to university emergency medical 
technicians (EMTs) were admissible in negligence 
action against university, even though there was 
statutory prohibition on admission of such state-
ments taken by adversary unless a copy was left 
with the plaintiff and the plaintiff did not disavow 
the statement; rule of evidence permitted admission 
of statements made for medical diagnosis to ad-
versary and limited application of the statute. 
West's U.C.A. § 78-27-33; Rules of Evid.. Rule 
803(4). 
[21 Negligence 272 ©=^1550 
272 Negligence 
272XVIH Actions 
272XVIII(C) Evidence 
272XVTTI(C)I Burden of Proof 
272k 1550 k. In General. Most Cited 
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Negligence 272 €^>1568 
272 Negligence 
272XVHI Actions 
272XVHKC) Evidence 
272XVll«C)l Burden of Proof 
272k 1568 k. Proximate Cause. Most 
Cited Cases 
Plaintiffs carry the burden of establishing a prima 
facie case of negligence, including proximate and 
actual causation of the injury. 
| 3 | Negligence 272 €^>1568 
272 Negligence 
272XVUI Actions 
272XV11KC) Evidence 
272XVUi(C)l Burden of Proof 
272U568 k. Proximate Cause. Most 
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272 Negligence 
272XV1I1 Actions 
272XV11KC) Evidence 
272XYTII(C)2 Presumptions and Infer-
ences 
272k 1599 k. Proximate Cause. Most 
Cited Cases 
The causal connection between the alleged negli-
gent act and the injury is never presumed and is a 
matter the plaintiff is always required to prove af-
firmatively. 
[4] Negligence 272 €^>1713 
272 Negligence 
272XV1II Actions 
272XV!lf(T)) Questions for Jury and Direc-
ted Verdicts 
272k 1712 Proximate Cause 
272kl7i3 k. In General. Most Cited 
Ca>es 
Although the question of proximate causation is 
generally reserved for the jury, the trial court may 
rule as a matter of law on this issue if there is no 
evidence to establish a causal connection between 
the alleged negligent act and the injury, thus leav-
ing causation to jury speculation. 
j5| Negligence 272 €^>1675 
272 Negligence 
272XVII1 Actions 
2~2XYIII<C) Evidence 
272XVUUC)5 Weight and Sufficiency 
272k 1674 Proximate Cause 
272k i 675 k. In General; Degrees of 
Proof. Most Cited Cases 
Where the injury involves obscure medical factors 
which are beyond an ordinary lay person's know-
ledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding 
as to whether the defendant's negligent act caused 
the injury, there must be expert testimony that the 
negligent act probably caused the injury; the testi-
mony of lay witnesses in such cases regarding the 
need for specific medical treatment is inadequate to 
submit the issue to the jury, and it is only in the 
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most obvious cases that a plaintiff may be excepted 
from the requirement of using expert testimony to 
prove causation. 
[6| Colleges and Universities 81 £~^>5 
8i Colleges and Universities 
81k5 k. Powers, Franchises, and Liabilities in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Plaintiffs fall on university steps was caused by 
medical factors sufficiently complicated to be bey-
ond the ordinary senses and common experience of 
a layperson, and thus, expert medical testimony was 
required to establish prima facie case for causation 
of her broken leg, where plaintiff initially attributed 
the fall to her knee "going out" and she admitted 
that she had preexisting osteoarthritis in her knee. 
West Codenotes 
Limited on Preemption GroundsWest's L'.C.A. § 
78-27-33 
*447 Joseph R. Fox and Linda A. Fox, Spanish 
Fork, Appellants Pro Se. 
Thomas W. Sciler, Provo, for Appellee. 
Before BENCH, P.J., McllUGH and TIIORNE, H. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
f I Plaintiffs Joseph and Linda Fox (the Foxes) ap-
peal the trial court's dismissal of their claims 
against Defendant Brigham Young University 
(BYU) for their failure to present expert testimony 
to prove the cause of Mrs. Fox's injury. The Foxes 
also appeal the trial court's order denying their ob-
jections to the admission of an affidavit and an ac-
cident report prepared by BYU volunteer emer-
gency medical technicians (EMTs) on the grounds 
that the admission of such evidence violates I'tah 
Code section 78-27-33. SeeLhih Code Ann. $ 
78-27-33 (2002). The trial court properly admitted 
the EMTs' report and correctly concluded that 1 tab 
(ode section 7^-27-^3 was impliedly modified in-
sofar as it is inconsistent with rule 803(4) of the 
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I tah Rules of L\ idencc And, because the *448 
EMTs' report contains Mrs Fox's admissions that 
her pre existing medical condition was a factor in 
her fall, the trial court correctly concluded that the 
nature of her injury was sufficiently complex as to 
require an expert to establish a prima facie case on 
the element of causation We therefore affirm 
BACKGROUND 
1 2 On April 20, 2004, Mrs Fox entered BYU's 
campus and went to the Harman Building to pur-
chase a ticket for an upcoming conference As Mrs 
Fox left the Harman Building, she descended the 
west stairway and fell After falling, Mrs Fox was 
unable to stand or use her right leg A passerby no-
ticed Mrs Fox and sought help 
% 3 In response to the request for help, EMTs ar 
rived and examined Mrs Fox The EMTs were vo-
lunteers for the Emergency Medical Services team 
at BYU BYU provides the van that the EMTs use 
to respond to field calls, and the EMTs are based in 
BYU's student center, the Wilkinson Center 
K 4 When the EMTs arrived at the steps ot the Har 
man Building, they found Mrs Fox in a seated pos-
ition on the stairs They observed that Mrs Fox's 
right knee was obviously swollen and that there 
was deformity on both sides of her leg They also 
noted that there was no external trauma to her leg 
or knee, such as scrapes or scuff marks, and that 
Mrs Fox's pants were not ripped or torn 
T| 5 While the EMTs were assessing her condition 
and treating her, Mrs Fox repeatedly stated to them 
that she felt her right knee go out as she was going 
down She explained to the EMTs that she fell 
down only one stair, that she had been previously 
diagnosed with osteoarthritis in her right knee and 
that there was some missing cartilage in that knee 
Mrs Fox also stated that she did not hold BYU re-
sponsible but that she had always felt that the stairs 
bv the Harman Building were too narrow and have 
always been dangerous 
Page 3 
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^ 6 Mrs Fox's statements, the EMTs' medical ob-
servations, and the treatment given at the scene of 
the fall were transcribed in a report, which Mrs 
Fox signed, and were also recounted in an affidavit 
submitted by one of the responding EMTs The 
EMTs applied a vacuum splint to Mrs Fox's leg 
and transported her to the Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center Emergency Room She was admit-
ted to the medical center and informed that she had 
a broken right leg She then underwent surgery, 
during which a fixator was attached to her leg 
D 7 Several days after Mrs Fox's fall, Mr Fox went 
to the Harman Building and examined the stairs He 
noted that there was some cracking in the stairs' ce-
ment and that some ot the metal nosings on the 
stairs were loose He took pictures of the cement 
and nosings, as well as the general area where he 
believed Mrs Fox had fallen No further examina-
tion of the stairs took place because they were re-
placed shortly thereafter, an improvement that had 
been scheduled prior to Mrs Fox's fall 
*} 8 The Foxes subsequently brought suit against 
BYU for negligence and loss ot consortium, assert-
ing that BYU had negligently maintained the stairs 
outside the Harman Building and that the defective 
stairs had caused Mrs Fox to slip, fall, and break 
her leg Prior to the scheduled bench trial, BYU 
brought a motion in limine asserting, among other 
things, that the negligence claim failed because the 
Foxes did not have expert testimony to establish 
their prima facie case Specifically, BYU contended 
that the only facts relating to the element of causa-
tion within Mrs Fox's ordinary senses, as a lay wit-
ness, were that she was descending the stairs and 
tell BYU urged that, by her admissions to the 
EMTs, Mrs Fox had introduced a medically com-
plex pre existing condition osteoirthntis, as a po-
tential tactor in her fall BYU therefore argued that 
the biomechanics involved in her tall, the medical 
cause of her injuries, and the need for the treatment 
she received were not within the ordinary senses of 
an^ layperson 
^ 9 The Foxes conceded that they would not be 
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presenting expert testimony at the bench trial. 
However, they asserted that lay testimony was suf-
ficient to establish their prima facie case because 
the injury and damages Mrs. Fox experienced were 
within the realm of common experience and be-
cause *449 there was no significant lapse of time 
between the injury and the onset of the physical 
condition for which Mrs. Fox sought compensation. 
The Foxes also objected to the admissibility of the 
EMTs' report and the affidavit, arguing that Utah 
Code section 78-27-33 prohibits the admission of 
statements made by an injured person that were ob-
tained by agents of her adversary, unless certain 
procedures are followed. The Foxes asserted that 
these procedures were not followed and BYU con-
ceded as much at the pre-trial hearing. 
Tl 10 The trial court agreed with BYU's position 
and, recognizing the dispositive nature of the issues 
presented in the motion in limine, converted the 
motion to one for dismissal pursuant to rule 41(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial 
court concluded that the EMTs' report and the affi-
davit were admissible under rule 803(4) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence because they contained state-
ments made by Mrs. Fox for purposes of medical 
diagnosis and treatment. The trial court held that, to 
the extent that Utah Code section 78-27-33 is in-
consistent with rule 803(4), the statute was im-
pliedly repealed by virtue of the Utah Constitution. 
1 11 The trial court also ruled that the Foxes could 
not sustain their burden of proof as to causation and 
damages because Mrs. Fox's lay witness testimony 
was insufficient to establish their prima facie case. 
In making this ruling, the court noted that it had 
been presented with two plausible theories of caus-
ation-failure of an osteoarthritic knee or defective 
stairs-and, absent expert testimony, the court would 
have to use speculation to choose between the two 
theories. The trial court also ruled that Mr. Fox's 
loss of consortium claim failed because it was de-
pendent on the viability and success of Mrs. Fox's 
negligence claim. Given the failure of both causes 
of action, the trial court dismissed the Foxes' suit 
with prejudice. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
j^ 12 The Foxes claim that the trial court erred by 
determining that Utah Code section 78-27-33 was 
partially repealed by the Utah Supreme Court's ad-
option of rule 803(4) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. " 'A constitutional challenge to a statute 
presents a question of law, which we review for 
correctness.... When addressing such a challenge, 
this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we 
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitu-
tionality/ " State v. Morrison. 200! UT 73, ^ 5, 
31 P.3d 547 (omission in original) (quoting State v. 
Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^ 6, QS0 P.2d 191). 
H 13 Further, the Foxes argue that the trial court 
erred by admitting the EMTs' report and the affi-
davit containing Mrs. Fox's out-of-court statements 
because the statements were procured by agents of 
the Foxes' adversary, BYU.'The standard of review 
when considering the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements under the Utah Rules of Evidence de-
pends on 'whether the trial court's analysis involves 
a factual or legal determination or some combina-
tion thereof.1 " State v. Parker. 2000 UT 51, * 13. 
4 P.3d 778 (quoting Hansen v. Heath, S52 P.2d 
977, 978 (Utah 1993)). "Whether a statement was 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment is a mixed question of law and fact." 
Hansen. 852 P.2d at 978. Thus, where the trial 
court's analysis "involves a factual determination 
that the statement was indeed made to aid medical 
diagnosis,11 id. at 978-79, this court will "apply a 
clearly erroneous standard of review to those 
[factual] findings,11 Parker, 2000 UT 51, 1 13, 4 
P.3d 778. But where the court's analysis involves a 
legal determination, such determination will be re-
viewed "for correctness.11 Hansen. #52 P.2d at 979. 
K 14 Finally, the Foxes claim that the trial court 
erred in dismissing their suit against BYU for fail-
ure to present expert testimony to establish a prima 
facie case on the element of causation. "As with a 
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directed verdict, whether dismissal was appropriate 
for failure to make a prima facie case is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness." Grosser! v. 
DeWht, 1999 UT App lo7, <j 8, 982 P.2d 581. "An 
appellate court will not reverse the findings of fact 
of a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are 
... clearly erroneous." Orion v Carter, 970 P.2d 
1254, 1256 (Utah W 8 ) (omission in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, 
"we review a trial court's legal *450 conclusions for 
correctness, according the trial court no particular 
deference." Id. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Admissibility of the EMTs' Report 
|^ 15 The Foxes claim that the EMTs' report and the 
affidavit were inadmissible because they included 
out-of-court statements that were obtained in viola-
tion of Utah Code section 78-27-33 and that the 
statute has not been impliedly repealed, even par-
tially, by the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of rule 
803(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Utah 
Constitution grants the supreme court the power to 
''adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used 
in the courts of the state." Utah Con>t. art. \ III. § 
4. In 1985, the supreme court used its constitutional 
power to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 
In Re: Rules of procedure and evidence to be used 
in the courts of this state, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(Utah 1985). At the same time, the supreme court 
adopted only those previously existing statutory 
rules of procedure and evidence that were "not in-
consistent with or superseded by [the new] rules of 
procedure and evidence." Id. In doing so, the su-
preme court made clear that "[a]ny existing statutes 
inconsistent with these rules ... will be impliedly re-
pealed." Utah R. Evid. Preliminary Note; see, e.g.. 
State v Fulton, 742 P 2d 120X, 1217 (f/tah 1987) 
(noting that the adoption of rule 601 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence impliedly repealed section 
78-24-2(2) and its presumption of incompetency for 
children under ten years of age). In order for the le-
gislature to "'amend the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court," it may 
only do so "upon a vote of two-thirds of all mem-
bers of both houses." Utah Const, art. VIIL § 4. 
|^ 16Utah Code section 78-27-33 existed at the time 
the supreme court adopted the new set of rules of 
evidence. Pursuant to this statute, a statement 
"obtained from an injured person within 15 days of 
an occurrence ... by a person whose interest is ad-
verse" is not admissible evidence unless the adverse 
person leaves a "written verbatim copy of the state-
ment ... with the injured party at the time the state-
ment was taken," and the injured party does not dis-
avow the statement "in writing" within a specified 
time. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-33 (2002). This stat-
ute was enacted in \913. See Act of February 23, 
1973, ch. 208, § 2, 1973 Utah Laws 709.P N l 
FN 1. Although the statute was amended in 
1998, after the supreme court's adoption of 
the rules of evidence, the amendment was 
minor and does not signal the legislature's 
attempt to amend the rules of evidence ad-
opted by the supreme court. The statute, as 
originally written, allowed statements pro-
cured by a "law enforcement officer" to be 
admitted, regardless of whether the law en-
forcement officer was adverse or may be-
come adverse to the injured party. In 1998, 
the legislature merely substituted the 
phrase "peace officer" for "iaw enforce-
ment officer." See Act of March 4, 1998, 
ch. 282, § 82, 1998 Utah Laws 1019. 
Moreover, the house bill that brought 
about the amendment was aimed at modi-
fying trie Utah Code with respect to peace 
officers. See Act of March 4, 1998, ch. 
282, 1998 Utah Laws 978 (describing the 
act as "relating to public safety; modifying 
and clarifying the various classifications of 
peace officers and the requisite training 
and certification; making technical 
changes; and providing a coordination 
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clause"). The bill cannot be construed, as 
the Foxes assert, as intended to address in-
consistencies between Utah Code section 
78-27-33 and the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
11 17 Since 1985, however, rule 803(4) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence permitted the admission of 
"[statements made for purposes of medical dia-
gnosis or treatment,'1 as well as statements 
"describing medical history, or past or present 
symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or 
general character of the cause or external source 
thereof,11 despite the fact that such statements may 
be hearsay. Utah R. Evid. 803(4). The only other 
qualification is that the statements must be 
"'reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.11 
Id."l£ the statement meets both qualifications, it is 
admissible because of the 'patient's strong motiva-
tion to be truthful' when discussing his or her med-
ical condition with a doctor.11 Hansen v. Heath, 852 
P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1993) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 
803(4) advisory committee's note). 
FN2. Statements made for purposes of 
medical diagnosis and treatment "need not 
have been made to a physician. Statements 
to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, 
or even members of the family might be 
included.11 Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) advisory 
committee's note. 
*451 [1] 1i 18 Therefore, there exists an inconsist-
ency as to the admissibility of evidence in the lim-
ited circumstance where the injured party's ad-
versary retains bona fide medical personnel who 
obtain statements from the injured party for the pur-
pose of medical diagnosis and treatment. Rule 
803(4) of the Utah Rules o\ Evidence permits the 
admission of all statements made for the purpose of 
medical diagnosis and treatment, such as Mrs. Fox's 
statements to the BYU EMTs, regardless of wheth-
er the medical personnel to whom the statements 
were made are adverse to the injured party or 
simply neutral. Without the requisite notice, 
however, Utah Code section 78-27-33 would not 
permit the admission of statements made for the 
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purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment when 
the statements are made to medical personnel who 
also serve as agents of the injured party's adversary. 
K 19 The facts of the instant case highlight the in-
consistency between rule 803(4) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence and Utah Code section 78-27-33. Here, 
the trial court correctly concluded that the EMTs 
responding to Mrs. Fox's fall, while volunteers, 
were nonetheless agents of BYU because they 
worked under BYU's name, used equipment sup-
plied by BYU, and operated from BYU's buildings. 
See Nelson v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
935 P.2d 512. 512 (Utah 1997) (acknowledging that 
a person may be a "volunteer agent11 of a principal); 
see a/so Restatement (Third) Agency § 1.01 (2006) 
("Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises 
when one person (a 'principal1) manifests assent to 
another person (an 'agent1) that the agent shall act 
on the principal's behalf and subject to the princip-
al's control, and the agent manifests assent or other-
wise consents so to act.11). BYU is, undoubtedly, 
Mrs. Fox's adversary in the present suit. Further-
more, the court committed no clear error by finding 
that Mrs. Fox's statements to the EMTs were in fact 
made for the purpose of receiving a medical dia-
gnosis of her condition and treatment of her injury. 
[^ 20 Given this inconsistency, we conclude that 
rule 803(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence partially 
repealed, or in other words, limited the applicability 
of Utah Code section 78-27-33. We emphasize, 
however, that Utah Code section 78-27-33 is inval-
id only to the extent that it is inconsistent with rule 
803(4), i.e., in the very narrow circumstance where 
an adversary retains bona fide medical personnel 
who obtain statements from injured persons for the 
limited and exclusive purpose of medical diagnosis 
and treatment. In circumstances where statements 
obtained by a potentially adverse party are not for 
purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, there 
is no inconsistency between the rule of evidence 
and Utah Code section 7S-27-33, and the statute re-
mains viable. 
€> 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
176 P.3d446 Page 7 
176 P.3d 446, 229 Ed. Law Rep. 256, 594 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2007 UT App 406 
(Cite as: l76PJd446) 
II. Dismissal for Lack of Expert Testimony 
[2][3][4] f 21 The Foxes contend that expert testi-
mony was not required to establish a prima facie 
case regarding the cause of Mrs. Fox's injuries be-
cause her fall, broken leg, and subsequent medical 
treatment were temporally connected and within the 
common knowledge and experience of a layperson. 
Plaintiffs carry the "'burden [of] establishing] a 
prima facie case of negligence," Clark v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 893 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct.App.1995), 
including "proximate and actual causation of the in-
jury,11 id. at 600; see also Jackson v. Colston, 1 16 
Utah 295, 209 P.2d 566, 568 (1949) ("It is funda-
mental that the burden rests upon the plaintiff to es-
tablish the causal connection between the injury 
and the alleged negligence of the defendant.11). 
"[T]he causal connection between the alleged negli-
gent act and the injury is never presumed and ... 
this is a matter the plaintiff is always required to 
prove affirmatively.11 Jackson, 209 P.2d at 568. 
Although "the question of proximate causation is 
generally reserved for the jury,11 Clark, 893 P.2d at 
601 (internal quotation marks omitted), "the trial 
court may rule as a matter of law on this issue ... if 
../there is no evidence to establish a causal connec-
tion, thus leaving causation to jury speculation,1 
id.(quoting Steffcnsen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 
820 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah Ct.App.l99l)). 
[5] U 22 In Utah, "[t]he need for positive expert 
testimony to establish a causal link between the de-
fendants' negligent act and *452 the plaintiffs in-
jury depends on the nature of the injury." Beard v. 
K-Mart Corp.. 2000 UT App 285, % 16, 12 P.3d 
1015 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 
"[w]here the injury involves obscure medical 
factors which are beyond an ordinary lay person's 
knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a 
finding, there must be expert testimony that the 
negligent act probably caused the injury.11 Id. 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In 
such cases, the "testimony of lay witnesses regard-
ing the need for specific medical treatment is inad-
equate to submit the issue to the jury.11 hi It is 
only in "the most obvious cases11 that a plaintiff 
may be excepted from the requirement of using ex-
pert testimony to prove causation, hi 
[6] f 23 Mrs. Fox's slip-and-fall negligence suit is 
not a case that is excepted from the requirement 
that a plaintiff use expert testimony to establish a 
causal link between the defendant's negligent act 
and her injury. At the scene of Mrs. Fox's fall, she 
first attributed the cause of her fall to the fact that 
her knee "gave out.11 She admitted to the EMTs 
that she had been diagnosed with a pre-existing 
condition, osteoarthritis, in that same knee. Thus, 
by her own initial explanation of the cause of her 
fall and her admission of an osteoarthritic condi-
tion, Mrs. Fox tied the cause of her fall to medical 
factors sufficiently complicated to be beyond the 
ordinary senses and common experience of a 
layperson. Mrs. Fox's lay testimony would not have 
been sufficient to determine whether the need for 
her medical treatment, the surgery and attachment 
of the fixator, was caused by BYU's allegedly de-
fective stairs or the failure of her own arthritic 
knee. Although Mrs. Fox could testify that she des-
cended the stairway, fell, and experienced pain, she 
needed expert testimony to establish her prima facie 
case of causation and to prevent the fact-finder 
from resorting to speculation. Absent this expert 
testimony, the trial court correctly ruled that Mrs. 
Fox had failed to prove the element of causation 
and her negligence claim failed as a matter of 
. FN3 law. 
FN3. We note that, in this case, it was the 
plaintiff herself who presented the two the-
ories of causation. By highlighting these 
dueling theories and emphasizing that un-
der one theory BYU's alleged negligence 
was not the cause of Mrs. Fox's fall, BYU 
was not presenting an affirmative defense, 
such as an intervening cause, for which it 
would have carried the burden of proof. 
Compare Nixdorf r. Hicken, 612 P.2d 
348, 353 a. 15 (Utah 1980) (indicating that 
an "intervening cause may be used as a de-
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fense against the plaintiffs proof of prox-
imate causation"), with State v. Malaga, 
2006 UT App 103, f 22, 132 P.3d 703 
(distinguishing between a defense that con-
templates an intervening force as the cause 
of the injury and a defense that presents an 
alternative version of events "which does 
not implicate intervening causes at all"); 
see also Scale v. Cowans. 923 P.2d 1361, 
1363 {Utah 1996) (stating that defendants 
have the burden of proof with respect to 
affirmative defenses). Rather, BYU was 
refuting the Foxes' preferred theory and re-
minding the court that "the burden of proof 
is on the plaintiff to show that the injury 
was negligently caused by [the] defendant, 
[and that] it is not enough to show the in-
jury ... might have occurred from negli-
gence and many other causes.11 Baxter v. 
Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257, 265 (1931) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 
"[w]hen a plaintiff produces evidence that 
is consistent with an hypothesis that the 
defendant is not negligent, and also with 
one that he is, [the plaintiffs] proof tends 
to establish neither.11 Id, (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
% 24 The trial court also correctly ruled that Mr. 
Fox's claim for loss of consortium failed because it 
was dependent on the success of Mrs. Fox's negli-
gence claim. Under Utah statute, a "spouse's action 
for loss of consortium ... [is] derivative from the 
cause of action in behalf of the injured personf,] 
and ... it may not exist in cases where the injured 
person would not have a cause of action.11 Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(5)(a), (b) (2007). Mr. Fox's 
loss of consortium claim ceased to exist when Mrs. 
Fox's negligence claim failed. 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Although Utah Code 
section 78-27-33 may have barred such reports, that 
statute is inconsistent with rule 803(4) and im-
pliedly modified to the extent of the inconsistency. 
The trial court did not err in dismissing the Foxes' 
negligence claim for failure to present expert testi-
mony on the *453 element of causation because the 
factors associated with Mrs. Fox's fall and injury 
were sufficiently medically complex to require such 
testimony. Because the loss of consortium claim 
was dependent on the viability of the negligence 
claim, the trial court properly dismissed it as well. 
H 26 We affirm. 
% 27 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH and 
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges. 
Utah App.,2007. 
Fox v. Brigham Young University 
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CONCLUSION 
% 25 The trial court did not err in admitting the 
EMTs' report and the affidavit because they con-
tained admissible hearsay pursuant to rule 803H) of 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Darlene BEARD, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
K-MART CORPORATION, Defendant and Appel-
lant. 
No. 20000095-CA. 
Oct. 19, 2000. 
Customer sued store for negligence after being ac-
cidentally struck by elbow of employee. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone Med-
ley, J., denied store's motion for partial directed 
verdict on damages issue and entered judgment 
upon jury verdict for customer. Store appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, held that: (1) expert 
testimony was required to establish that store's neg-
ligence caused the need for customer to undergo 
three surgeries subsequently performed on her neck 
and wrists; and (2) surgeon's testimony was insuffi-
cient to show store's negligence caused conditions 
requiring surgery. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
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Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
T| I Defendant/appellant K-Mart Corporation 
(K-Mart) appeals the trial court's denial of its mo-
tion for a partial directed verdict. We reverse and 
remand for a new trial. 
FACTS 
Tj 2 On September 15, 1996, plaintiff/appellee Dar-
lene Beard (Beard) was injured in a K-Mart store 
Page 2 
when a K-Mart employee struck her in the head 
with his elbow as he attempted to start a lawn-
mower. As she fell toward the floor, she felt a 
severe headache, as well as pain in her wrists, knee, 
and ankle. She visited her doctor the following day, 
complaining of head, neck, knee, and foot pain, and 
continued to have severe headaches, a sore neck, 
aching hands, and leg and foot pain. Beard saw a 
number of doctors and ultimately underwent a num-
ber of surgeries. Beard sued K-Mart for its employ-
ee's negligence in striking her. Three surgeries, per-
formed on her neck and wrists by Dr. Robert 
Peterson, are at issue in this appeal. K-Mart asserts 
these surgeries are not causally connected to the ac-
cident at its store. 
H 3 At trial, Beard testified that her neck and wrist 
problems began when she was struck in the head at 
K-Mart. In addition, her family physician and her 
surgeon Dr. Peterson testified "there was a chrono-
logic association for the time of the incident [at K-
Mart] to the time of the onset of symptoms." 
However, Dr. Peterson testified that he could not 
say to a degree of reasonable medical probability 
that the accident at K-Mart caused the need for 
either her neck or wrist surgeries. 
U 4 At the close of Beard's case, K-Mart moved for 
a partial directed verdict, arguing Beard had not 
presented sufficient evidence * 1017 to permit the 
jury to find that her need for the neck and wrist sur-
geries was the proximate result of the injuries she 
FN 1 had suffered at K-Mart. The trial court denied 
K-Mart's motion, and the jury awarded Beard 
$431,290.22 in damages. 
FN1. Both parties characterize K-Mart's 
motion as one for a directed verdict; 
however, the motion was effectively one 
requesting a jury instruction excluding 
consideration of the evidence regarding the 
neck and wrist surgeries. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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T| 5"When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's 
denial of a motion for directed verdict, we review 4 
"the evidence and all reasonable inferences that 
may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most fa-
vorable to the party moved against, and will sustain 
the denial if reasonable minds could disagree with 
the ground asserted for directing a verdict." ' " 
Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, % 16, 990 P.2d 
933 (quoting White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297. 1300 
(Utah 1983) (quoting Cook Assocs., Inc. v. War-
nick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1 165 (Utah 1983})). If we con-
clude Beard did raise a material fact precluding 
judgment against her as a matter of law, we must 
affirm the trial court's denial of K-Mart's motion 
and uphold the jury's verdict. See id. 
ANALYSIS 
f 6 K-Mart argues Beard failed to present expert 
medical testimony establishing that her need for 
neck and wrist surgeries was caused by K-Mart's 
negligence. The essence of K-Mart's argument is 
that Beard's own testimony and the general testi-
mony of her doctors that she did not suffer neck 
and wrist complaints before the injury at K-Mart is 
insufficient as a matter of law to allow the jury to 
consider whether these surgeries were a result of K-
Mart's negligence. K-Mart argues that only expert 
medical testimony that the need for her surgeries 
was proximately caused by K-Mart's negligence 
will suffice. Thus, K-Mart argues the trial court 
erred in not directing a verdict in its favor and re-
moving this evidence from the jury's consideration. 
|^ 7 K-Mart relies on Denney v. St. Mark's Hospital, 
21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 < 1968), for the pro-
position that "if the expert evidence offered on the 
issue of medical causation is simply that a particu-
lar injury could have resulted from a particular ac-
cident, but not that it probably did, such testimony 
is insufficient for submission of the issue to the 
jury/1 In Denney, the plaintiff had undergone neck 
surgery and was having K-rays taken of her lumbar 
spine for unrelated treatment when a medical tech-
nician forcefully pushed her neck close to her 
knees, allegedly causing a feeling like an electric 
shock in the back of her neck. See Denney, 442 
P.2d at 944-45. Two days later, she suffered a 
stroke. See id. More than four months later, the 
plaintiff told her neurologist that her neck had been 
forced forward during the spinal x-rays. See id. 
The following year, a spinal fusion was performed 
and a neck nerve severed to relieve pain. See id. 
The plaintiff alleged the x-ray technician's negli-
gence was responsible for her ailments. See id. At 
trial, she testified as to the feeling in her neck when 
the technician pushed on it, and to continuing pain, 
numbness, and loss of vision after the incident. See 
id. Additionally, her neurologist testified that the 
force used by the technician could cause disc prob-
lems, but on cross-examination admitted it was a 
"medical probability" that her ailments were the 
result of the stroke. Id. 
% 8 The Utah Supreme Court sustained the trial 
court's directed verdict in favor of the hospital. See 
id. at 946. The court stated: 
in those cases which depend upon knowledge 
of the scientific effect of medicine, the results 
of surgery, or whether the attending physician 
exercised the ordinary care, skill and know-
ledge required of doctors in the community 
which he serves, must ordinarily be established 
by the testimony of physicians and surgeons. 
The only facts in the instant case which may be 
ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses of a 
lay witness are that the technician moved 
plaintiffs body, and that the back of her head 
hurt. No lay witness *1018 can by the ordinary 
use of his senses say that the complaints of the 
plaintiff, including the hurting in the back of her 
head, was caused by this claimed adjustment of 
her position on the x-ray table. 
Id. (quoting Fredrick wn v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 
3*7. 227 P.2d 772. " 74 (1951)). The court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs evidence did not show 
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that her injuries were the result of the negligence of 
the technician. See id. at 947. 
% 9 K-Mart also relies on Moore v, Denver <£ Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company. 4 Utah 2d 255, 
292 P.2d 849 (1956). In Moore, the plaintiffs doc-
tor testified that "it was possible" that plaintiffs ac-
cident had caused a ruptured lumbar disc and nerve 
pressure. Id. at 850. The doctor estimated a five 
percent permanent disability "based in part on the 
predictability of exacerbation and remission of 
pain" over time. Id. The defendant moved to strike 
the doctor's testimony, arguing that "possibilities" 
were not probative, but the trial court denied the 
motion. Id. An instruction taking consideration of a 
ruptured disc from the jury on the basis that no 
competent evidence had been given on the matter 
was likewise refused by the trial court. See id. 
\ 10 On appeal, the defendant argued that the doc-
tor's testimony was "insufficient to provide a ques-
tion of the existence of an injured disc." Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court recognized that the doctor's 
testimony regarding the permanency of the 
plaintiffs disability was "linked to the possibility of 
a disc injury" and was a significant part of the 
plaintiffs case. Id. The court stated: "Under these 
circumstances, if the proof of such an injury falls 
short of that required under our law, then an in-
struction to that effect should have been given the 
jury." Id. at 850-51. The court noted that under 
long-standing Utah law, a "plaintiff retains the bur-
den of proving his damages by competent evidence 
to an extent where the trier of fact could discover 
that which is probably true." Id. at 851 (emphasis 
added). The court agreed with the plaintiff that 
there was evidence of some injury, but stated: 
the jury was allowed to speculate upon the exist-
ence of a disc injury, which may be determinative 
of the important element of permanency of the in-
jury when no affirmative evidence was offered on 
this issue. Although the medical testimony indic-
ated that the symptoms showed a nerve irritation, 
and that such symptoms were consistent with the 
existence of a disc injury, we cannot discover in 
the witness' words anything more than their co-
rollary that, under the circumstances a disc injury 
was not impossible. 
Id. at 259, 292 P.2d at 851. Because there was a 
strong likelihood the jury considered the perman-
ency of the injury to have been proven by expert 
testimony, the court reversed the jury's verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff, holding that a limiting in-
struction should have been given. See id. 
% 11 In the instant case, K-Mart argues that al-
though Beard testified her neck and wrist problems 
began at the time of her injury at K-Mart, her belief 
that her neck and wrist surgeries were, therefore, 
the result of that incident cannot overcome the fail-
ure of the medical evidence to substantiate that be-
lief 
T| 12 In contrast. Beard argues she was not required 
to put on expert medical evidence. Beard claims 
that under Utah law, expert medical opinions are 
generally only required in medical malpractice 
cases. We disagree. 
T| 13 Beard presents cases from other jurisdictions 
holding that expert medical testimony is not re-
quired to submit to the jury questions about the 
need for medical treatment and expenses. See, e.g., 
Jordan v. Smoot, 191 Ga.App. 74, 380 S.E.2d 714, 
715 (fQ89); Polacn v. Smith, 376 So.2d 409, 
409-10 (Fla.Ct.App.1979); Walton v. Gcillbraith. 
15 Mich.App. 490, 166 N.W.2d 605, 606 (1969). 
However, we conclude these cases are factually dis-
tinguishable as they involve medical damages with-
in the common experience of a layperson. 
% 14 In Smoot, the plaintiff sued the defendant for 
injuries she sustained in an automobile collision. 
See 380 S.E.2d at 714. Her case consisted of ""her 
testimony and that of the responding police officer, 
pictures of her damaged car, and her medical bill." 
Id. The *1019 plaintiff testified that she visited a 
chiropractor the day of the accident and following 
the accident and that the chiropractic treatments 
had given her relief. See id. The trial court direc-
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ted a verdict for the defendant "on the ground that 
plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie personal 
injury case because she had not introduced expert 
medical testimony" connecting the collision and her 
injuries. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals re-
versed, stating "where, as here, there is no signific-
ant lapse of time between the injury sustained and 
the onset of the physical condition for which the in-
jured party seeks compensation, and the injury sus-
tained is a matter which jurors must be credited 
with knowing by reason of common knowledge, ex-
pert medical testimony is not required.11 Id. 
(emphasis added). 
K 15 Beard also relies on Walton v. Gallhraith, 15 
Mich.App. 490, 166 N.W.2d 605 (1969). In Walton, 
the plaintiff sued the defendant for neck, back, and 
shoulder injuries caused by a car accident. See id. 
at 605. At trial, no physician testified for the 
plaintiff, and the defendant "objected to the admis-
sion into evidence of bills for medicine and treat-
ment on the ground that there was no showing that 
they were causally connected with the ... accident.11 
Id. The defendant also requested an instruction to 
exclude the jury's consideration of the bills. See 
id. The trial court denied both motions, and the 
jury awarded the plaintiff $3500 in damages. See 
id. On appeal, the defendant argued it was error to 
introduce plaintiffs medical bills. See id. The 
plaintiff, on the other hand, argued "that a causal 
connection between the accident and the injury may 
be shown without expert testimony.11 Id. at 605-06. 
The court stated: 
A brief review of the function of the jury leads us 
to the conclusion that plaintiffs position is the 
correct one. Her testimony emphasizes the facts 
that there were no previous neck or back pains 
and that they began the day after the accident. 
In a situation such as this, it should be clear to 
men of common experience that the cause of the 
injuries was the accident and no expert was 
needed to demonstrate this fact. 
Id. at 606 (emphasis added). Therefore, the court 
Page 5 
sustained the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
See id. 
[1][2][3][4] K 16 In this case, the question is not 
whether the accident at K-Mart caused Beard in-
jury, but rather whether injuries sustained as a res-
ult of the accident at K-Mart required the neurolo-
gical surgeries performed on Beard's neck and 
wrists. Beard was properly permitted to testify that 
the accident in the store caused pain and injury. The 
question as to whether such pain and injury resulted 
from the blow is within the common knowledge 
and experience of lay witnesses and could properly 
be submitted to the jury. What is missing in the 
evidence, however, is the link between the injuries 
suffered and the necessity of the surgeries. In Utah, 
in all but the most obvious cases, testimony of lay 
witnesses regarding the need for specific medical 
treatment is inadequate to submit the issue to the 
jury. See generally Denney v. St. Mark's Flos p.. 2i 
Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968); Moore v. Den-
ver & Rio Grande W.R.R. Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 
P.2d 849 (1956); Chief Consol. Mining Co. v. 
Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 P. 929 (1922). Certainly 
whether the need for complex neurological surgery 
was a result of the accident at K-Mart is not within 
the common experience of laypersons. As stated in 
Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 44 Wash. A pp. 
244,722 P.2d 819, 824(1986): 
The need for positive expert testimony to estab-
lish a causal link between the defendants' negli-
gent act and the plaintiffs injury depends upon 
the nature of the injury. Where the injury in-
volves obscure medical factors which are beyond 
an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating 
speculation in making a finding, there must be 
expert testimony that the negligent act probably 
caused the injury. 
Id. at 824. "The diagnosis and potential continuance 
of a disease are medical questions to be established 
by physicians as expert witnesses and not by lay 
persons.11 Eherhart v. Morns Brown College, 181 
Ga.App. 516, 352 S.E.2d 832, 834 (1987). Thus, we 
conclude expert testimony on this medical causa-
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tion issue was required before the issue *1020 of 
damages arising from these surgeries was submitted 
to the jury. 
[5] % 17 Plaintiff alternatively contends that even if 
she was required to put on expert medical testi-
mony that her need for neck and wrist surgeries was 
caused by the accident at K-Mart, she introduced 
adequate expert medical testimony. 
% 18 Dr. Peterson, the surgeon who performed 
Beard's neck surgery and both wrist surgeries, testi-
fied extensively regarding the causes of Beard's 
neck pain, wrist pain, and his surgical treatment of 
them: 
A: [T]he question is, you know, what the cause 
is. The answer is, basically, I have no way of 
proving anything. But the association is that 
Mrs. Beard came to me and-and, more or less, 
was a person who was doing well prior to this in-
cident at K-Mart and since that time has been suf-
fering a rather significant problem which could 
be-you know, which was associated with some 
significant anatomic compromise in her neck. 
And from my standpoint, there was a chronologic 
association from the time of the incident to the 
time of the onset of the symptoms. 
Q: [by Beard's counsel]: What do you mean by 
chronological association? 
A: Happened at the same time.... [T]o my know-
ledge, [Beard] did not have these complaints pri-
or to being hit at K-Mart. 
Q: Can you interpret for us what you found on 
the MRl? 
A: Bone spur. 
Q: What causes bone spurs? 
A: Well, sort of the same thing that causes a 
bunion, irritation, disk-an old disk herniation 
Page 6 
which has receded, abnormal movement, local ir-
ritation. 
Q: Is that also the aging process as well? 
A: Being on a planet with gravity. 
Q: [by K-Mart's counsel]: You performed neck 
surgery on Darlene Beard because she had mar-
ginal osteophytes in her neck, bone spurs. 
A: That's essentially correct. 
Q: Those were pre-existing to September 15, 
1996. 
A: That would be my best guess. 
Q: In fact, you termed, in your deposition, that as 
a severe form of degenerative disk disease; is that 
correct? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: All of that was pre-existing long before this K-
Mart incident ever happened? 
A: No argument. 
Q: Do you know how long? 
A: Have no idea. 
Q: Do you know how they got there? 
A: As mentioned previously in testimony, it is es-
sentially concomitant with being on a planet with 
gravity long enough. But it has to do with local 
irritation and other potential compromises such 
as trauma. 
Q: You don't know whether it was trauma, wheth-
er it was heredity, whether it was wear and tear, 
whether it was gravity-as to how those bone 
spurs got there. 
A: Absolutely no idea. 
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Q: And you're not saying to the jury, to a degree 
of reasonable medical probability, that this incid-
ent at K-Mart caused such a condition in her 
neck; isn't that correct? 
A: No, I'm not telling the jury that at all. 
Q: You just don't know, do you? 
A: No. 
H 19 When questioned about the wrist surgery, Dr. 
Peterson testified: 
Q: Do you have any reason to believe that any 
other incident, other than the accident of 
9-15-96, may have caused this condition? 
A: No. 
Q: Okay. Could trauma cause that? 
A: Trauma-trauma can cause carpal funnel syn-
drome. At least certainly aggravate pre-existing 
condition. 
Q: Okay. And so, you're not telling the jury, 
again, to any degree of reasonable probability 
that her carpal tunnel was caused by this incident 
at K-Mart; isn't that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
*102l K 20 We simply cannot say from the record 
before us that the expert medical testimony was 
sufficient to allow the jury to consider whether 
Beard's surgeries were necessitated by K-Mart's 
negligence and if so what damaee she suffered as a 
result of those surgeries. "* Without the required 
expert medical opinion linking the injury to the ne-
cessity of the surgery, a jury would simply be spec-
ulating about a linkage that is beyond its knowledge 
and experience. The expert medical testimony 
merely established a chronological relationship 
Page 7 
between the accident and her symptoms. No expert 
medical testimony was received that the neck and 
wrist surgeries were necessitated by her accident. 
Thus, it was error for the trial judge not to grant a 
directed verdict removing these issues from the 
jury. Therefore we must reverse and remand for a 
new trial. 
FN2. Counsel for K-Mart conceded and we 
conclude that Beard will have an opportun-
ity on remand to offer competent expert 
medical testimony on the issue of whether 
the accident at K-Mart either caused the 
need for her neck and wrist surgeries or 
exacerbated a pre-existing condition which 
necessitated the surgeries. 
t 21 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge, 
and WILLIAM A. THORNE, Judge. 
Utah App.,2000. 
Beard v. K-Mart Corp. 
12 P.3d 1015, 406 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2000 UT App 
285 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Addendum "C" 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008) 
\Vcstlaw 
U C A 1953 § 78A-4-103 Page 1 
f> 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-2a-3 
West's Utah Code Annotated ( uirentness 
Title 78A Judiciary and Judicial Administration (Rets <k \nnos) 
*ii Chapter 4 Court of Appeals 
_• § 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process neces-
sary 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees, or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals 
from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Re-
sources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
(I) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and 
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section 61G-1-602, 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a con\ iction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony, 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a 
first degree or capital felony 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Par-
dons and Parole except in cases invoking a first degree or capital felony 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
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(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the 
Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Proced-
ures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c 3. 5 350, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008. c. 382, § 2210, eff May 5. 2008. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1476, provides: 
"Section 1476. Coordinating H.B. 78 with H.B. 63—Superseding amendments. 
"If this H.B. 78 and H.B. 63, Recodification of Title 63 State Affairs in General, both pass, it is the intent of the 
Legislature that the amendments in this H.B. 78 supersede the amendments to the same sections in H.B. 63, ex-
cept that the section renumbering and internal cross references to Title 63 in H.B. 63 supersede and shall replace 
the section numbering and references to Title 63 in H.B. 78 when the Office of Legislative Research and Gener-
al Counsel prepares the Utah Code database for publication/1 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2008, c. 3, § 350 and 
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2210. 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 1986, c. 47, §46. 
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 304. 
Laws 1988, c 73, § I. 
Laws 1988, c. 210, § 141. 
Laws 1988, c. 248, § 8. 
Laws 1990, c 80, § 5. 
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Laws 1990, c. 224, § 3 . 
Laws 1991, c. 268, §22. 
Laws 1992, c. 127, § 12. 
Laws 1994, c. 13, § 45. 
Laws 1995, c. 299, §47. 
Laws 1996, c. 159, § 19. 
Laws 1996, c. 198, § 49. 
Laws 2001, c. 255, §20. 
Laws 2001, c. 302, §2. 
C. 1953, § 78-2a-3. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Military court, see §§ 39-6-15 and 39-6-16. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Administrative Law and Procedure C^> 651 to 686, 721 to 726. 
Courts €^> 207, 248, 483 to 488. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k207; 106k248; 15Ak651 to 15Ak686; l5Ak721 to 15Ak726; 106k483 
to 106k488. 
C.J.S. Courts §§ 193 to 202. 
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 172 to 201, 204, 208 to 212, 218 to 219, 259 to 271. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Appellate jurisdiction, 
Adoption, jurisdiction of Supreme Court, review of state court's interpretation of state law, due process, 
see O'Connell v. Kirehner, U.S.UL1995, 115 S.Ct. 891. 513 U.S. 1303. 130 L.Ed.2d 873. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
In general 1 
Administrative entity determinations 5 
Appeals from courts not of record 3 
Attorney fees 8 
Criminal convictions 6 
Extradition orders 7 
Final judgments and orders 4 
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Issuance of prerogative or remedial writs 9 
Mandamus 10 
Original appellate jurisdiction, generally 2 
1. In general 
District court did not have appellate jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to circuit court orders binding de-
fendants over for trial, in absence of any statutory delegation of appellate jurisdiction to district court; legis-
lature vested appellate jurisdiction over circuit court proceedings in Court of Appeals. L'.C.A.I 953, 63-46b-15, 
77-35-7, 78-2a~3(2)(d), 78-3-4(5). State v. Humphrey. 1(>90, "94 P.2d 496, certiorari granted 804 ?2d 1232, re-
versed 823 P.2d 464. Criminal Law €^=> 1018 
Failure of defendant to file direct appeal before seeking postconviction relief was not a jurisdictional defect 
which would prevent the Court of Appeals from reviewing the district court's decision denying habeas corpus. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(f). Gomm v. Cook, 19X8. 754 P.2d 1226. Habeas Corpus €==> 813 
2. Original appellate jurisdiction, generally 
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction over a district court's review of a city council's decisions on 
zoning issues. U.C.A.1953. 78-2-2(3)(j), 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i). Bradley v Pa>son City Corp., 2001, 17 P 3d 1160. 
412 Ctah Adv. Rep. 26. 413 Utah Adv Rep. 13, 2001 LT App (), certiorari granted 26 P.3d 235, vacated 70 P.3d 
47. 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2003 I T 16. Zoning And Planning € = > "41 
3. Appeals from courts not of record 
Magistrate was not "court of record," and thus Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction over interlocutory ap-
peal from magistrate's order binding defendant over for trial on re filed felony charge. Const. Art. 8, § 5; 
U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(2)(d). State v. Fisk, 1998, 966 P 2d 860, 353 Utah Ad\ Rep. 34. Criminal Law €^> 
1023(3) 
4. Final judgments and orders 
Employer's petition for review was filed prematurely with Court of Appeals, before Labor Commission's final 
agency action denying employer's motion for reconsideration of award in favor of injured worker, despite fact 
that employer filed within statutorily specified period after motion was "considered denied" by Commission's 
inaction on motion, where Commission could and did change "considered denied" date to later date, and thus, 
Court lacked jurisdiction to consider employer's appeal. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-l(9), 63-46b-!3(3)(b), 
78-2a-3(2)(a). McCoy v. Utah Disaster Kleenup, 2003. 65 P 3d 643. 467 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. 2003 UT App 49. 
Workers' Compensation € ^ > 1875 
5. Administrative entity determinations 
Labor Commission's interim order finding that workers' compensation claimant qualified for permanent total 
disability was not final and appealable order, even though administrative rule stated that preliminary determina-
tion of permanent total disability, by Labor Commission or Appeals Board, was final agency action for purposes 
of appellate judicial review, where statute, which controlled over administrative rule, provided that finding by 
Commission of permanent total disability was not final, unless otherwise agreed by parties, until reemployment 
plan was prepared and considered, and parties agreed this had not occurred. Target Trucking \ . Labor ConVn, 
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2005, 108 P.3d 128. 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 1 L 2005 UT App 70. Workers' Compensa t ion©^ 1833 
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over district court review of land use decisions by local gov-
ernment entities, since Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over orders over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original jurisdiction, and Court of Appeals did not have original jurisdiction to hear chal-
lenges to land use decisions by municipal governing bodies; there was no statutory provision that expressly 
granted the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction over district court review of land use decisions by local gov-
ernmental entities. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i). Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003, 70 P.3d 47, 472 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12,2003 UT 16. Courts ©=> 206(17.1) 
Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider company's petition for review regarding conversion of 
citation proceeding based on hiring of unlicensed electricians to perform electrical construction work from in-
formal to formal adjudicative proceeding by Department of Commerce, Division of Occupational and Profes-
sional Licensing; conversion order was not final order. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-l6, 78-2a-3(2)(a); 
U.C.A.1953(1993 Ed.), 58-55-2(32)(C). Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Oc-
cupational and Professional Licensing, 1995, 902 P.2d 151. Administrative Law And Procedure ©33? 704; Li-
censes ©333 4 1 
Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review orders that reserve something for further decision by 
agency. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-l6, 78-2a-3(2)(a). Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 1995, 902 P.2d 151. Administrative Law And Procedure ©=> 704 
"Collateral order doctrine," which allows review of orders that conclusively determine disputed question, re-
solve important issue completely separate from merits of action, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from final judgment would not be applied to appeal from administrative action. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-16, 
78-2a-3(2)(a). Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, 1995, 902 P.2d 151. Administrative Law And Procedure ©33? 704 
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over petition for extraordinary writ challenging denial of motion to recuse 
presiding officer of Division of Environmental Response and Remediation (DERR) based on fact that presiding 
officer was also staff attorney. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-l(3)(a), 78-2a-3(l)(b). V-l Oil Co. v. Department of Envir-
onmental Quality, Div. of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 1995, 893 P.2d 1093, certiorari granted 910 P.2d 425, re-
versed 939 P.2d 1 (92, 317 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. Administrative Law And Procedure ©33? 657.1; Environmental 
Law ©33? 634 
Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review decision by division of police officer standards and training 
(POST) not to pursue decertification of wildlife conservation officer; since POST did not conduct any formal 
proceedings, there was no final order resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, and citizen's filing of com-
plaint with POST did not require it to conduct formal proceedings. U.C.A. 1953, 63-46b-l et seq., 63-46b-16, 
78-2a-3(2)(a). Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Standards and Training, (POST), Dept. of Public Safety, 
1993. 85 i P.2d 1201. Administrative Law And Procedure ©33? 704; Game ©333> 6 
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to rule on whether the Tax Commission complied with remand order of the 
Supreme Court, notwithstanding claim of Commission that its decision on remand was not a final appealable or-
der because decision called for a further proceeding; appeal was an enforcement proceeding to determine if 
Commission complied with remand order, and Supreme Court has jurisdiction by statute to issue all process ne-
cessary to carry into effect its orders; since case was transferred, Court of Appeals stood in shoes of Supreme 
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Court. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2-2(2), 78-2a-3(l)(a), (2)(k). Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 1993, 
848 P.2d 715, certiorari granted 860 P.2d 943, reversed 874 P.2d 840. Taxation €^=> 2693 
Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction, pursuant to statute granting Court jurisdiction to review final agency 
actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, to review Division of Occupational and Professional Li-
censing's administrative law judge's denial of motion to dismiss unprofessional conduct petitions filed against 
person licensed to administer health facility, even though licensee had petitioned to have order reviewed by Di-
vision and such review was denied. U.C.A. 1953, l3-i~12(l)(a), 63-46b-16(l). Barney v. Division of Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing, Dept. of Commerce, 1992. 828 P.2d 542, certiorari denied 843 P.2d 516. 
Health C=> 223(0 
Court of Appeals would not defer ruling on jurisdictional issue until consideration of merits of appeal from ad-
ministrative law judge's denial of motion to dismiss professional conduct petitions filed against person licensed 
to administer health facility, since Court's first duty was to determine whether it had jurisdiction. U.C.A. 1953, 
13-1-I2(l)(a), 63-46b~16(l). Barney v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Dept. of Com-
merce, 1992, 828 P.2d 542, certiorari denied 843 P.2d 516. Health € ^ > 223(1) 
Statute giving the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over final orders and decrees of state and local agen-
cies or appeals from the district court review of them defines the outermost limit of the Court of Appeals appel-
late jurisdiction and allows it to review agency decisions only when the legislature expressly authorizes a right 
of review. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(2)(a). DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 1988, 764 P.2d 627. Admin-
istrative Law And Procedure C^> 663; Administrative Law And Procedure C^> 681.1 
In the absence of specific statute creating right to judicial review of order of county board of appeals. Court of 
Appeals had no jurisdiction. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(2)(a). DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 1988, 764 
P.2d 627. Administrative Law And Procedure C ^ ^ 663 
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear appeal from district court order affirming administrative suspension of 
license to operate a cosmetology/barbering school. U.C.A. 1953, 78~2a-3; U.C.A. 1953, 58-1-36 (Repealed); 
Const. Art. 8, § 5; Const. Art. 8, § 9 (Repealed); Court of Appeals Rule 4A. Scientific Academy of Hair Design, 
Inc. v. Bowen, 1987, 738 P.2d 242. Administrative Law And Procedure ©=^> 681.1; Licenses €^> 38 
6. Criminal convictions 
State's ability to take appeal in criminal case is limited. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 26(3). State v. Quinn, 1996, 930 
P.2d 267, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 309 Utah Adv. Rep. 1 I, rehearing denied. Criminal Law € ^ > 1024{ 1) 
State could not take interlocutory appeal of magistrate's order denying its request to enhance defendant's driving 
under the influence (DUI) charge to third-degree felony, as order did not fit within any of categories of appeal-
able decisions. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(3). State v. Quinn, 1996, 930 P.2d 267, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 309 
Utah Adv. Rep, 11, rehearing denied. Criminal Lau C^> 1024(9) 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writ which challenge the 
conviction of or sentence for first-degree felony or capital felony. U.C.A. 1953. 78-2-2(3)(j), 78-2a-3(2)(h). Neel 
v. llolden, 1994, 886 P.2d 109"?. Habeas Corpus € = > 8 1 3 
Because petitioner was not challenging his conviction or sentence, he should have appealed dismissal of his 
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habeas corpus petition to Court of Appeals rather than Supreme Court. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(2)(g). Padilla v. 
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 199 L 820 P.2d 473. Courts € ^ > 248 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over direct appeal of first degree or capital felony conviction and over petition 
for extraordinary writ used as substitute for direct appeal of such conviction or sentence; Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction in all other cases. U.C.A. 1953. 78-2a-3(2)(g). Northern v. Barnes, 1991, 814 P.2d 1148, certiorari 
granted 843 P.2d 1042. Courts € ^ > 248; Criminal Law € ^ > 1018; Criminal Law € ^ > 1019; Criminal Law 
€^> 1020 
Writ challenging postconviction actions of Board of Pardons was properly before Court of Appeals where it did 
not challenge conviction in trial court or sentence; fact that defendant was serving sentence for first-degree 
felony did not require transfer to Supreme Court. U.C.A. 1953, 78~2a-3(2)(g). Northern v. Barnes, 1991, 814 
P.2d 1148, certiorari granted 843 P.2d 1042. Courts €^> 248 
When sentencing judge reduces conviction, appeal lies in court having jurisdiction of degree of crime recorded 
in judgment of conviction and for which defendant is sentenced, rather than degree of crime charged in informa-
tion or found in verdict. U.C.A. 1953, 76-3-402, 78-2-2(3)(i), 78-2a-3(2)(f). State v. Doting, 1991, 813 P.2d 
1 168. Criminal Law € ^ > 1019 
Under statute granting Court of Appeals original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writs "involving a criminal conviction," Court of Appeals lacked original appellate jurisdiction of 
appeal from denial of extraordinary writ involving an interstate transfer of a prisoner, which bore no relation to 
the underlying criminal conviction except that, "but for" the conviction, he would not have been incarcerated in 
Arizona and then transferred to Utah. U.C.A. 1953, 78~2a~3, 78-2a-3(2)(g). Ellis v. DeLatid, 1989, 783 P.2d 559, 
transferred to 786 P.2d 231. Habeas Corpus €^> 813 
7. Extradition orders 
Court of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction over appeal by prisoner held for extradition to Idaho in Utah 
county jail from district court's denial of prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to statute provid-
ing subject matter jurisdiction of appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving criminal 
convictions; language of the statute is sufficiently broad to include those cases in which criminal conviction is 
involved in habeas corpus proceeding to challenge extradition. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(2)(g). Hernandez v. Hay-
ward, 1988, 764 P.2d 993. Habeas Corpus €=^> 813 
8. Attorney fees 
When party who prevails on appeal in divorce action, yet was not awarded fees at trial, claims attorney fees on 
appeal solely on basis of new allegations of change in financial condition and those allegations are not a matter 
of record and have not been adjudicated by finder of fact, Court of Appeals cannot evaluate claim; prevailing 
party's claim for attorney fees on appeal based on allegation of need must be addressed by trial court to determ-
ine need of claiming spouse, ability of other spouse to pay, reasonableness of fees and amount, if any, to be 
paid. U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-3, 78-2a-3. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 1994, 875 P.2d 598. Divorce €^> 287 
9. Issuance of prerogative or remedial writs 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction, under statutory exception to Court of Appeals'jurisdiction over appeals from 
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orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging decisions of Board of Pardons, to hear original direct ap-
peal from district court's unconditional order of release on prisoner's petition challenging decision made at his 
original parole grant hearing which fixed length of his prison stay for two first-degree felonies. U.C.A. 1953, 
78-2-2(3)(j), 78-2a-3(2)(g, h); Rules App.Proc, Rule 44. Preece v. House, 1994, M6 P.2d 508. Courts € ^ > 248 
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over petition for extraordinary writ; by issuing writ sought by petition, court 
would only be carrying into effect its judgments, orders and decree in previous cases directing judge to comply 
with Rule 63(b) with respect to several of petitioner's cases. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-3(l)(a); Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 
63(b). Barnard v. Murphy, 1994, 882 P.2d 679. Courts €^> 207.1 
Where Court of Appeals had appellate jurisdiction over subject matter of divorce case in which petitioner who 
filed petition for extraordinary writ had been a party, Court of Appeals had authority to issue necessary writs in 
connection with that case, even if no appeal was pending. U.C.A, 1953, 78-2a-3(l)(b). Barnard v. Murphy, 1994, 
882 P.2d 679. Courts € ^ > 207.1 
10. Mandamus 
Court's decision to grant or deny petition for extraordinary relief in nature of mandamus is discretionary with 
court to which petition is brought, in sense that it is never matter of right on behalf of applicant. V-l. Oil Co. v. 
Department of Enviroimiental Quality, Div. of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 1997, 939 P.2d 1 192, 31.7 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 11. Mandamus € ^ > 7 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78A-4-103, UT ST § 78A-4-103 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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ADDENDUM "D" 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
NAN T.BASSETT-^8909 
GARYT. WIGHT -;n0994 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, PC 
Attorneys for Pefendanl 
10 Exchange Place. 4,,; Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84i 1 I 
l oiepnone: i&01; J2 * -3 "7;« 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
•ONAT HON HALL 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
Plan t IT MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JliDGMENT 
} ASONSTE1MLE 
Case No. 040403916 
Defendant. 
Judge James R. Taylor 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by this Court on March 25, 2008 
Defendant .U.son Stenrtic v as lep^eseiii'ixi bv Gary T Vughi. Plaintiff Jonathon Flail was 
^presented bv Rex I Eagar. 
Based upon the panics memoranda ar.u o;a! argument upon Defendant's Motion, this 
Court holds that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant should be dismissed with prejudice. 
Specifically, this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are as follows: 
Of 
1 Plaintiff Jonathon Hall assents negligence claims against Defendant Jason Steimle 
arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 11, 2000. 
2. in the summer of 1998 or 1999, Plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury when he dove 
lulu a siiuiiovv iakT. 
3. Plaintiff received chiropractic treatment for the whiplash injury, 
4. On October 4, 2000—just over two months before the December 2000 motor 
vehicle accident Plaintiff presented to Anderson Chiropractic, complaining of neck and back 
pain. 
5. in his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered permanent neck and back 
injuries as a result of the Decembei 2000 motor vehicle accident. 
6. According to the Amended Stipulated Scheduling Order filed with this Court, 
Plaintiffs expert reports were due on June 1, 2007 
7. Plaintiff never filed an ex pen: report ;n accordance with Rule 26 of the Utah Ruies 
of Civil Procedure. 
8. Under Utah law. where the injur}' in question involves obscure medical factors 
which are beyond an ordinary' lay person's knowledge, there must be expert testimony that the 
negligent act probably caused the injury. 
9. In light of Plaintiff s injuries and treatment prior to the December 2000 motor 
vehicle accident. Plaintiff was required to designate an expert on causation. 
2 
10. Because Plaintiff designated no expert on causation, he cannot provide evidence 
that the December 2000 motor vehicle accident caused the injuries described in his Complaint. 
Accordingly, this Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES: 
1. Defendant's Morion for Sum«iia»v Jsdgi;i;ir is gran^d: ~:)£ 
2. Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice. 
3. Each party shall bear us own attorney's fees and costs associated with this 
motion. 
DATED this , : ? 3 day of _ 
*t ,2008. . 
BY THE COURT 
.APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JAMES R. T 
District Court Judge 
IVIE & YOUNG 
,n 
UlK-fJ. / /<g-V 
~r JARED R. CASPER 
REX I. EAGAR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
! hcrehv c^r^fv \\\JX • mr 1 ; ^ on *.h:> / -*?.v of V^ch, 200?., pcr-V-:e.e tver-aid. 
of the foregoing Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment to the 
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